Was colonization costly for France? Did French taxpayers contribute a lot to colonies' development? This view has been widely accepted among French historians, though little empirical evidence has been provided. Using original data from the colonial budgets of French West Africa and the central budgets of France, this paper provides new insights into colonial public nances in this region. It reveals that the cost of colonization of French West Africa for French taxpayers was extremely low: French public aid to French West Africa accounted for 0.008 percent of annual total metropolitan expenses. Most of the expenses for French West Africa were for military conquest and central administration: including these costs raises the cost of French West Africa to 0.27 percent of total metropolitan expenses. This means that colonization was protable for France as soon as its impact on domestic production exceeded 2,904 million 1914 Francs (total) over 1844-1957 (representing a 0.3 percentage points increase of the average annual tax revenue). From the West African perspective, French taxpayers' contribution was almost negligible: public aid to French West Africa amounted to 0.4% of its revenue. However, metropolitan public investors provided 5.7% of French West Africa's revenue through loans and cash advances. On the contrary, colonization turned out to be a considerable burden for Africans since French government ocials were paid by Africans taxpayers until 1956 and absorbed a disproportional share of the public expenditures.
Introduction
On February 23th 2005, the French parliament adopted a law imposing the recognition of the positive role of colonization in French history textbooks (law n°2005-158 1 ). The proponents of this law argue that French colonization allowed the colonies to benet from massive investments in education, health, infrastructure, agriculture etc. that boomed their development. This view investments (Marseille, 1996; Lefeuvre, 2005) .
Both views are supported by little and incomplete evidence and leave a large share to opinion and interpretation. One reason for the lack of evidence is the nature of the costs and benets of colonization: some costs and benets like the quality of institutions, the psychological eects of being colonized / being the colonizer on collective self-esteem and trust towards the institutions, or loss of life during WWI and WWII, would denitively be a stretch for a quantitative assessment.
A second reason for the lack of hard evidence is that very question of the costs and benets of colonization would require an estimation of the impact of colonization which can harldy be identied due to the absence of counterfactual: Africa was enterily colonized, except Egypt. Similarly, it might be dicult to nd productive sectors in France that were not potentially aected by colonization to serve as a control group. The immediate consequence is that the causal impact of colonization on African and French economies remain unknown: we don't know what would have been African and French performances (e.g. investments in education, level of and returns to private investments, domestic production or more generally the welfare) had colonization not exist.
The question that I want to address in this paper is therefore more modest: I take the levels of public resources in both France and the colonies as given and ask who supported the cost of public expenses in the colonies. This question remains crucial since the usual argument from those scholars and politicians claiming on the positive role of colonization is that French taxpayers paid for the public investments made in the colonies. Taking the amount of public resources in the metropole and in the colonies as given (i.e. ignoring the endogeneity of tax revenue in both and Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch produced some evidence on the nancial transfers between the metropole and the colonies, but unfortunately the analysis remained incomplete 3 (Bobrie, 1976; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1973 and 1982) . Jacques Marseille has been credited as the one who provided a nal answer to the question of the cost of colonization for French taxpayers when he published his dissertation in 1984 (Marseille, 1984) , but his analysis is not based on reliable evidence and 2 Recherche Coopérative sur Programme (RCP), CNRS, Commerce, investissements et prots dans l'empire colonial français , n°326, 1973-1979. 3 Part of the collected data was lost while the university moved, especially data on French West Africa therefore remains unconvincing (Huillery, 2009) . New insights into the colonial public nances are therefore needed, and this paper is an attempt to ll the gap. French colonies, the purpose of this study is to answer the question for one specic territory without claiming on external validity. This study is a building block of a larger study on the whole French empire. Colonization varied signicantly from a territory to another within French empire, largelly adapting both insitutions and the economic strategy to local context. For this reason, it seems crucial to dierentiate the analysis by territory to paint an accurate picture of the cost of French colonization. From the former colonies' point of view, whose development paths since independance diered signicantly, it is also more informative to learn about each territory separately rather than the average.
Results show that the nancial cost of AOF for the metropole was low: on average, public aid to French West Africa accounted for 0.008 percent of annual total metropolitan public expenditures.
The cost of the military conquest and central administration represented the vast majority of the metropolitan expenditures for this territory: including these costs raises the share devoted to French West Africa from 0.008 to 0.27 percent of total metropolitan public expenditures. This allows us to conclude that colonization of French West Africa was a protable experience for France as soon as its impact on domestic production exceeded 2,904 million 1914 Francs, which represents a 0.3 percentage points increase in the average annual tax revenue over the 1844-1957 period.
4 I let aside the territories that remain French today, since colonization is still ongoing there. 5 Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Tchad and Centrafrique.
On the French West African side, metropolitan public aid was not as beneciary as is often presented: it accounted for 0.4 percent of total local public revenue. In addition to subsidies, the metropole also oered West African ocials the opportunity to borrow some nancial resources abroad. Including public loans and cash advances, which were systematically reimbursed in due time during colonial times as shown by colonial budgets, total metropolitan nancial transfers represented on average 5.7 percent of total local public revenue. Local taxes thus accounted for the vast majority of French West Africa's revenue. These results can explain why public investments in French West Africa were so scarce: budget data show that there were only 1,000 teachers, 1,400 doctors and 300 schools in the whole West African territory on average from 1907 to 1956. Some infrastructure was constructed, mainly to serve transportation of local products from inland to coastal export seaports. However, my data show that the nal amount devoted to infrastructure remained very low (). The scarcity of colonial public investments in West Africa can rst be explained by the low level of nancial support from the metropole. Nevertheless, the analysis of colonial budgets gives a second crucial explanation: the cost of colonial public goods was disproportionally high compared to the limited nancial capacity of the local population, due to the very fact that public resources were collected on an African basis while spent on a French basis. French teachers, doctors, engineers, lawyers etc. and administrative sta were actually all paid on a metropolitan basis and got an additional allowance for being an expatriate, resulting in a disproportionally high income compared to local incomes (). These salaries were charged on local colonial budgets rather than on the metropolitan budget. To give an idea on how much the French sta salaries weighed heavily on local budgets, the only governors, district administrators and their respective cabinets altogether accounted for 20 percent of total local public expenses. The colonial system therefore turned out to be more of a black than white man's burden. This paper attempts to clarify the debate on the cost of French colonization in the specic case of French West Africa. With respect to the existing literature, the paper innovates in using original and rst-hand budgetary data on the whole colonial period. I also distinguish subsidies (public aid) from loans and cash advances (investments), which was a reason why the budgetary cost of colonization has been misinterpreted in the existing research. Moreover, the paper considers both transfers from the metropole to AOF and transfers from AOF to the metropole which, when ignored, caused another misleading caveat in the existing literature. Finally, the paper does not make any assumptions in the calculation of nancial transfer balance from the metropole to AOF but simply uses actual data on colonial public nancial transfers, as opposed to the leading part of the existing literature. The paper therefore provides a reliable and comprehensive view on the colonial public nance system and public investments in French West Africa. Yet an important limitation of the paper is the restricted geographical coverage. The results on French West Africa should be considered as specic until a more extended study is performed on the whole French colonial empire. It seems likely that North Africa, especially Algeria, might have experienced a dierent more generous colonial nance system. This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 formalizes the welfare eects of colonization on taxpayers to clarify what questions are (not) addressed in this paper. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy that is developed to answer these questions. Section 4 presents data sources and gives a description of collected data. Section 5 presents evidence on the main variables of interest, while section 6 presents the main results of the paper, that is the cost of AOF colonization for French taxpayers and the benets of AOF colonization were for West Africans. Section 7 gives further evidence on public expenditures in AOF. Section 8 concludes.
Formalizing the Welfare Eect of Colonization on Taxpayers
In this section, I consider the basic channels through which colonization could have aected the welfare of taxpayers. Taxpayers' welfare W is a strictly increasing function f of disposable income, which depends on domestic production Y , tax rate τ and public expenditures G:
The economy is therefore dened by the triplet (Y, τ, G).
The counterfact that I consider here is the absence of colonization between the metropole and the colony, with no other colony for the metropole and no other metropole for the colony 6 . In the absence of colonization (hereafter, tilda refers to this counterfact), the amount of public expenditures are simply equal to the tax revenue:G = τỸ , and thus the welfare of taxpayers depends only on domestic production:W = f ( Y ). In the presence of colonization, the metropole and the colony increase their bilateral trade of goods and capitals, which has an impact on domestic production Y . Transfers of public resources also take place between the metropole and the colony: T o denotes public transfers going out of the economy (to the other economy) and T i denotes public transfers 6 Another plausible reading of the late 19th century's history would be to consider the most likely alternative to French colonization to be Portuguese, Spanish or British rule, not independent African rule.
going in the economy (from the other economy). So in presence of colonization, public expenditures are dened by:
Whether colonization increases the welfare of taxpayers is therefore simple to characterize (we assume that f is continuous):
Meaning that colonization improves the welfare of taxpayers as long as the variation in domestic production due to colonial trade is higher than the net public transfer from the economy to the other. This simple formalization of the problem leads therefore to clear welfare eects on taxpayers:
For the economy which transfers relatively less public resources (negative net transfer), colonization is beneciary for taxpayers for any increase in domestic production as well as for small enough decreases in domestic production, such that the loss in domestic production is compensated by the gain from bilateral public transfers.
For the economy which transfers relatively more public resources (positive net transfer), colonization is beneciary for taxpayers only for large enough increases in domestic production, such that the increase in domestic production compensates the loss in bilateral public transfers.
The contribution of the paper is to provide T o and T i for both the metropole and French West Africa, which gives the lower bound of the variation in domestic production that would make colonization beneciary for French and West African taxpayers: T o − T i . Our work also gives τ Y (tax revenue)
in French West Africa, from which we could infer Y using an estimation of the average tax rate 7 .
Data on Y in metropole is already avalaible from French national statistic records. The remaining parameter,Ỹ , is the counterfactual domestic production in the absence of colonization. A challenge for future research is to give evidence onỸ and compare this evidence with the T o − T i bound to conclude on the welfare eects of colonization on taxpayers.
7 Such an estimation is not an easy task but I think that it would be feasible since the colonial budgets report the tax rate for each tax (or at least the main ones) in the economy. to both the public sector (federal government and public companies) and to the private sector 8 .
At the federal level, the federal budget received most of its revenue from federal taxes, mostly trade taxes and scal taxes. The federal budgets also received subsidies and cash advances from the national budget. The expenses of the federal budget covered the running costs of federal administration (federal personnel salaries, material and furniture), and also some equipment expenses related to large-scale infrastructure like trans-colonial railways and seaports. The federal budget also transferred some funds towards the metropole: public loans repayments, cash advances repayments and subsidies. Finally, the federal budget provided some subsidies to the colonies (which are partly rebates to colonies on the customs revenue taken out of each colony) and to private companies.
Auxiliary budgets existed at the federal level in addition to the federal budget: rst, the loan budget , whose revenue was based entirely on public loans contracted with the metropole. Funds from loans were allocated to large-scale infrastructure, and marginally to investments in health and education. Second, special budgets (budgets spéciaux) devoted to the accountability of public companies like railway companies, the port of Abidjan, the port of Dakar and the port of Conakry.
The revenue of these auxiliary budgets were four-fold: subsidies and cash advances from the federal budget, subsidies and cash advances from the national budget, cash transfers from the loan budget and nally self-generated resources from the company's activities. These auxiliary budgets received cash assets from the metropole but the repayment of the corresponding loans or cash advances was charged on the federal budget.
At the local level the level of the colonies, the budgets received revenue from local taxes, plus subsidies from the federal budget. Local budgets covered all the running costs related to local colonial administration: the government of the colony and the administration of districts and subdivisions, the costs of judicial processes, security and treasury, the costs of public support to agricultural and industrial activities, and the costs of public investments at the local level:
education, health and infrastructure. However, one can adopt another approach under which transfers in AOF are not equal to transfers out of the metropole: the metropolitan budget supported expenses that did not go into AOF's budgets: type 1 expenses (military costs of conquest and pacication) and type 2 expenses (running cost of the central administration). These two types of expenses can be interpreted as the cost of being the colonizer: they occurred asymmetrically because colonization itself is asymmetric, one economy dominating the other -at least politically and institutionally. The domination happened at a cost which is the costs of the military conquest and central administration, that is, the dierence between the transfers out of the metropole and the transfers in AOF.
Transfers to the Private Sector
Both the metropole and AOF provided resources to private colonial companies (although for the metropole, this support was quite limited since it provided resources to one single private company in AOF: a subsidiary society of La Société de Construction des Batignolles, which was selected among other companies to construct and operate the Dakar-Saint-Louis railway line). These transfers aimed at providing support to private agents to help them creating income generating activities in AOF. It is not clear how they should be considered in our framework. One possible counterfact is that the nancial support to the private sector was a transfer from French taxpayers (that is, decreasing metropolitan public expenditures G) to AOF taxpayers who would have had to pay for the construction and operating costs of the private companies in the absence of metropolitan support (that is, increasing AOF public expenditures G). Under this view, the nancial transfers from the metropole to private colonial companies should be included in transfers out of the metropole / in AOF. Another possible counterfact is that these transfers are not going out of the metropole nor in AOF because the beneciaries are French private entrepreneurs who beneted from public support to operate their business. Under this view, AOF taxpayers would not have provided resources to these private colonial companies in the absence of metropolitan support and the rms would have incurred the normal market conditions while operating their business.
Dierentiating Financial Investment and Cost
Financial transfers are not of the same nature: some correspond to nancial investment while others are just cost. Actually, loans and cash advances that come with an market interest rate are nancial investment making both the borrower and the lender better-o if everything with the credit goes well. On the contrary, subsidies are really a cost for the donor. However, loans and cash advances can be contracted at concessional nancial terms, i.e. at a preferential interest rate in comparison to what the market would have oer to both the borrower and the lender. In this case, loans and cash advances entail an aid component that represents a form of subsidy from the lender to the borrower. Whenever the interest rate charged for a credit is lower than the discount rate, the present value of the debt is smaller than its face value, with the dierence reecting the (positive) grant element of the credit. Following the denition of Ocial Development Assistance (ODA) introduced by the OECD in 1969, a minimum grant element of at least 25 per cent is required so that a loan can be considered as public aid.
Counterfacts of Interest
To synthetize this discussion, transfers from the metropole to AOF can be decomposed in ve components:
Transfers from We propose to consider several counterfacts of transfers between the metropole and AOF.
A=Aid-to-AOF=(5)- (7) This counterfact focuses on the amount of money that was given to AOF by French taxpayers, i.e. public aid to AOF. I thus limit the transfers from the metropole to AOF to the denition of ODA so that the cost of colonization for the metropole is limited to the net subsidy to AOF. Note that the aid component of loans and cash advances are included in the denition of ODA so are included in this counterfact.
B=Cash-Assets-Received-by-AOF=(3)+ (5)- (6)- (7) This counterfact focuses on the cash assets that AOF received from the metropole and consequently increased AOF taxpayers'
welfare. This counterfact ignores the cost of being the colonizer (the cost of conquest and central administration) because this cost does not correspond to transfers received in AOF.
This counterfact also ignores the cost of the nancial support to French colonial entrepreneurs because the French entrepreneurs cannot be considered as AOF agents (stockholders were French).
C=Charges-for-French-Taxpayers=(1)+(2)+(4)+ (5)- (7) This counterfact takes into account all expenses related to colonization that were supported by French taxpayers, including the cost of being the colonizer (cost of conquest and central administration) and the support to French colonial private companies. This corresponds to the total amount of resources that was taken on the metropolitan budget for funding AOF colonization 9 . It diers from the Transfers-in-AOF counterfact in two dimensions: rst, resources spent on colonialrelated activities outside AOF are included because these resources were taken away from the metropolitan budget; second, loans and cash advances -net of their aid component-are excluded because the corresponding resources were invested in AOF, not taken away from the metropolitan budget.
To our sense, there is no reason why one counterfact should dominate the others since all of them
give an interesting information on colonial public nances. Their relative relevance depends on the question at stake. As exposed in introduction, this paper proposes to answer two questions:
what share of French tax revenue was allocated to AOF? What share of local public resources was received from the metropole?
The rst question should be addressed using counterfacts A and C. Under counterfact A, Aidto-AOF, we focus on the contribution of French taxpayers to the development of AOF with the hanging question about the positive role of colonization. Under counterfact C, Cost-for-FrenchTaxpayers, we focus on the total cost of colonization for French taxpayers, not only the expenses that beneted directly to AOF development. Using this counterfact thus gives the minimum increase in domestic income required to make colonization a protable investment from French taxpayers' point of view.
To answer to the second question on the share of local public resources received from the metropole, both counterfacts A and B are interesting: Transfers-in-AOF gives the cash assets provided by the metropole, which would be particularly relevant had colonization have provided access to credit to regions that would not have had access to it in the absence of colonization. Aidto-AOF gives a more restrictive vision of what AOF received from the metropole, which would be particularly relevant had AOF have had access to credit anyway.
Data
The original datasets used in this paper and related documentation are available online at http://econ.sciencespo.fr/sta/elise-huillery (Public Finance Data)
9 Just a reminder that this is not equivalent to the amount of resources that would have been available at the metropolitan level had colonization not occurred since colonization itself might have changed the French tax revenue. Upper Volta during this period of time. Because collecting data at the district level was over the time I had, I did not collect data from the local budget for every year of the colonial period, but for 25 years: 1907-1920, 1923, 1925, 1928, 1930, 1933, 1936, 1939, 1943, 146, 1949, 1953 and 1956. Francs. These transfers can be detailed as follows: Repayments of loans represent 40% of total transfers from AOF to the metropole, subsidies 35% and repayment of cash advances 25%. increased the amount of subsidies given to AOF (see Figure 2 ) but in a give and take logic since at the same time, subsidies from AOF to the metropole also increased (see Figure 3) . On the whole colonial period, net ODA given to AOF by the metropole amounts to 48.8 million 1914 Francs.
Counterfact B: Cash Assets Received by AOF
This counterfact takes into account all the cash assets: loans, cash advances and subsidies, received by AOF from the metropole. Table 1 shows the total cash assets that went from the metropole to AOF between 1898 and 1957. In 60 years of colonization, 1,304 million (1914 Francs) were transferred from the metropole to AOF: 
Total 1 304
Loans accounted for 39% of total transfers from the metropole to AOF. Cash advances accounted for 42% and subsidies for 19%. The part of metropolitan nancial transfers which were recovered through repayments loans and cash advances represented 81% of total metropolitan nancial transfers. 
Counterfact C: Charges Related to AOF Colonization for French Taxpayers
This counterfact takes into account all the expenses related to the colonization of AOF charged on the metropolitan budget. It is the cost of colonization for French taxpayers in the sense that this counterfact represent the amount of the domestic tax revenue that was allocated to expenses related to AOF colonization: military cost of conquest and pacication, the cost of the central administration, and the subsidies to the private and the public sectors. Our data do not allow for disentangling between subsidies to the private and to the public sector, although we know that the last subsidy provided to the private sector occurred in 1928. Table 3 presents the total amount of the charges related to AOF colonization for French taxpayers as well as the decomposition by category of charges: Military cost of conquest and pacication accounted for 77% of the charges related to AOF colonization, while the cost of the central administration accounted for 12% and the subsidies to the private and the public sectors for 11%. Figure 7 shows the evolution of the charges related to AOF colonization over the colonial period. 
Charges Related to AOF Colonization for French Taxpayers
We can observe that the military cost of conquest and pacication accounts is a very large share of cost of AOF colonization until 1945 (88%). We can also observe that the cost of the central administration exploded at the end of the colonial period. This sharp increase is due the decision to transfer some personal expenses from the local budgets to the metropolitan budget at this date.
This allows to construct counterfact C: year by year, I substract subsidies from AOF to the metropole to the cost of AOF colonization for French Taxpayers. Results are presented in Figure 8 .
The total of net charges related to AOF colonization over 1844-1957 amounted to 2,904.4 million (1914 Francs). This corresponds to the total of charges related to AOF colonization reported in does not take into account the nancial transfers from the colonies to France, especially transfers from Algeria whose scal revenue was fully translated into metropolitan revenue. Marseille (1996) estimates that metropolitan expenses devoted to the colonies accounted for 8% of total expenses in the twenties, and 9% of total expenses from 1945 to 1962. But this estimation is based on the assumption that all trade decits of the colonies towards France were compensated by equivalent nancial transfers from France to the colonies. It is not clear whether these nancial transfers were public or private nancial transfers, and whether they were loans and cash advances (which are investments) or subsidies. Moreover, the assumption needs to be veried because there are ways by which colonial trade decits could be paid other than nancial transfers from France.
Therefore, evidence from actual budgets is needed. 
How Benecial was Colonization for the West Africans?
The question now is whether the transfers received by AOF from the metropole represented a signicant share of AOF's public resources. There is a large consensus in France regarding the idea that metropolitan nancial transfers to the colonies funded most of public investments there. It is indeed possible that colonial public transfers did not cost much for French taxpayers but still accounted for a large part of local revenue.
To answer this question, I gathered all data from local, federal, loan and auxiliary budgets to calculate AOF's total revenue (Appendix 1 presents descriptive statistics on AOF's total tax revenue). Figure 11 presents the share of AOF total revenue provided by the metropolitan transfers, under both counterfact A (in red) and counterfact B (in blue). It shows that the share of AOF total revenue provided by all cash assets (counterfact B) varied a lot across the periods, from 25% in 1907 (which means that AOF received 25% of its revenue from metropolitan cash assets in 1907)
to -15% in 1917 (which means that AOF gave 15% of its revenue to metropolitan cash assets in 1917). On average, metropolitan cash assets provided 5.7% of AOF total revenue over 1907-1957. 
Summary of the Main Results
AOF relied essentially on local revenue. Metropolitan public aid accounted for an average of 0.4% of AOF revenue and 0.008% of metropolitan public expenditures. Including the loans and cash advances that the metropole provided to AOF, the contribution of metropolitan assets to AOF revenue amounts on average to 5.7%. Finally, our results show that all costs implied by AOF colonization amounted on average to 0.27% of metropolitan public expenditures. Table 3 sums up these ndings: 
Further Results on Public Expenditures in French West Africa
From the previous section we know that public nancial transfers from the metropole to AOF were not burdensome for French taxpayers and not super beneciary neither for AOF. So denitively AOF paid almost all its own public investments. Now the question is: how large were these investments?
In France, there is actually not only a belief that French taxpayers paid for public investments in the colonies, but also that these investments were large. French President Nicola Sarkozy pronounced a controversy speech in Dakar on July, 26th 2007 in which he mentions how beneciary colonial public investments were for local population, referring to schools, roads, hospitals, dispensaries, bridges etc 14 . So even if public investments were funded by local people, colonization could have beneted to AOF in the sense that colonial power organized tax collection, logistics and management of large colonial public investments. Before colonial times, some Muslim schools (`écoles coraniques') existed but no public schools delivering a classical lecture, writing and mathematics curriculum.
Neither modern medical practices nor modern infrastructure could be found. Nobody knows what would have been public investments in AOF during the twentieth century had the territory not been colonized. But still it is true that colonization did organized public investments in the colonies and that the amount of colonial public investments can be used as an indicator of how much colonial organization benet to AOF.
The Magnitude of Public Investments in French West Africa
Colonial public investments can be categorized as follows: education, health, infrastructure and support to productive sectors. In education, most of the investments were made in primary education in both rural and urban areas, and less importantly in secondary education in urban areas.
Education sta was heterogenous, going from highest ranked French teachers (`hors-classe') to simple African monitors. Local budgets reported the number of teachers and schools in colonies, so I was able to calculate the total number of teachers and schools in AOF for some years. Figure 12 reports the total number of teachers and schools for the years when the total was available in budget data. In 1907, 282 teachers and a bit less than 200 schools were located in AOF there were 198 schools in 1911, which is the earliest data on total schools. According the colonial censuses, AOF 
Colonial Public Investments in AOF
In the health sector, the local budgets give data on the number of doctors and nurses in each colony. Health sta was as heterogeneous as education sta, entailing both highest ranked military doctors and simple African unskilled workers. Figure 12 reports the total health sta for each year this data is available. It is noticeable that the evolution of education and heelth stas are very similar. There were 247 health care employees in AOF in 1907, while 6,104 in 1956. As in education, these amounts seem very low compared to the size of the territory.
In the infrastructure sector, the colonial budgets do not detail the number of road kilometers or bridges or whatever which would have been impossible actually, but do give the amount of expenses in infrastructure by category by type of infrastructure (transport, buildings, water and improvement) and by type of work (construction or reparation). Note that the expenses devoted to infrastructure were mostly made of material rather than personal; the costs of personal for infrastructure was low compared to material because most people doing public works were not paid for that the colonial power included a number of days everyone had to spend on doing public works as a tax, which was nothing but coerced labor . Figure 13 shows the evolution of expenses devoted to infrastructure from 1907 to 1956. It shows a bigger variability than expenses in education and health, which makes sense since it is easier to compress expenses in material than expenses in personal. This support was supposed to provide agriculture or industry innovation capacity. Some money was devoted to this in the 1940s, but overall it remains very rare. The annual average expenses devoted to support to productive sectors is only 1.6 million 1914 Francs. This conrms Jean Dresh's analysis on colonial economic system, which he calls économie de traite : colonial investments focused on infrastructure supporting export/import transportation rather than on transforming and improving local productive capacity. 
Human Capital Transfers from the Metropole to AOF
Another way through which AOF could have beneted from colonization is human capital transfer.
French emigrants in AOF embodied some general skills that could have been transferred to African people. So the idea is that a large number of French emigrants in AOF could have resulted in a signicant increase in local human capital.
As to the public sector, some budgets mostly the earlier ones, distinguished between French and African civil servants. This allowed me to compute the proportion of Africans among colonial civil servants (or at least an estimate of it based on available data). by metropolitan public nancial transfers, which is wrong in the case of AOF. This paper therefore addresses major caveats in the existing literature.
Many Africans still believe that they owe French colonizers their schools, hospitals and infrastructure. But the reality is that they nanced with their own resources almost the totality of these public investments. Moreover, they supported the high cost of French colonial administration.
Colonization therefore reveals to have been more of a black than white man's burden. 
AOF Public Revenue -Total
After 1945, the growth of AOF total revenue is spectacular: it was multiplied by ve in 13 years.
Both federal revenue and local revenue grew fast during this period, federal revenue in a higher speed than local revenue, though.
Appendix 2: Discussion on Jacques Marseille's Hypothesis As documented in Marseille (1996) , the French colonies in general and AOF in particular experienced structural trade gaps towards the metropole during the colonial period. Marseille argues that some metropolitan public nancial transfers to the colonies compensated these trade gaps, which were therefore a big burden for French taxpayers 16 . This argument is based on the fact that the balance of payments requires nancial transfers to be balanced, which is true. But there are ways by which payments between the metropole and the colonies could be balanced other than through metropolitan public nancial transfers.
First, the metropolitan nancial transfers to the colonies could have been private investments, which do not seem like a cost for French taxpayers but a source of income for French investors.
According to the returns on investment reported in Coquery-Vidrovitch (1973) and Marseille (1984) , private investments cannot be considered as part of public aid but were on the contrary often very protable. 
Surplus of AOF Federal Budgets
To conclude, there is not enough evidence on payments between the colonies and the metropole to understand exactly how payments were balanced during colonial time. However, the analysis of the colonial budgets denitely shows that AOF trade gaps towards the metropole were not compensated by public metropolitan nancial transfers. Using trade gaps is therefore a misleading way to measure the cost of colonization for French taxpayers.
